

SOVIET AFFAIRS ANALYSIS SERVICE

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This special issue of the Soviet Affairs Analysis Service provides additional material for articles by the Service on the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

KHRUSHCHEV ON STALIN -- 1937 TO 1961: EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES AND REPORTS

Khrushchev's speeches and reports provide interesting comparison of his public opinion of Stalin. The following are brief quotations from the years 1937-1957--all except the last, which originates from a speech at the twenty-second Soviet Party Congress in 1961.

From Khrushchev's speech at the Eighth Extraordinary Congress of Soviets in 1936:

Our Party has victoriously led and is leading the working class, because at its head stood that genius of mankind, Lenin, because our Party is now being led by the brilliant Stalin. . . . During the civil war, Stalin appeared in every place where the issue was in doubt, and wherever he appeared victory remained with the army of the revolution. . . . Stalin, his genius, and his will, are familiar to all of us, to every worker of our country, because there is not a single undertaking directed toward the strengthening of the might of our motherland, toward the socialist well-being, which has not been inspired by Comrade Stalin. . . . We know, comrades, to whom belongs the main credit for our victories. This credit belongs to our leader Comrade Stalin. . . . wherever this gang of murderers and scoundrels, whose crimes can hardly find precedent in history, were quickly unmasked and destroyed, we are indebted primarily to Comrade Stalin, who sagaciously summoned the Party and all the workers of our country to an intensification of revolutionary class vigilance, and who warned that the remnants of defeated hostile classes would attempt everything in the malice of their death agony. The genius of Comrade Stalin has guaranteed victory to the Party and all the workers of our country. . . . (Pravda, December 2, 1936, p. 4).

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From a report by Khrushchev to the Moscow City Party Conference in 1937:

The working class and all the workers of our country have attained great victories of socialism thanks to the wisdom, thanks to the vigilance and the inexhaustible energy of the great continuator of the work of Lenin, the leader of the peoples of the USSR, the friend of workers of the whole world, Comrade Stalin. . . . We must always remember the words of comrade Stalin that the USSR is within capitalist encirclement, that the enemies of socialism are sending and will send us spies, that they will apply all means in their attempt to undermine the might of our socialist motherland. . . (Pravda, May 24, 1937, p. 4).

From a report to the Fifth Moscow Oblast Party Conference in 1937:

. . . All workers are boundlessly devoted to our Party, to our Central Committee, to our Comrade Stalin. We Bolsheviks surround our Stalinist Central Committee with still greater love, sacrifice of our strength, and if necessary of our life. . . (Pravda, June 7, 1937, p. 2).

From a report to the Eighth Party Congress in 1939:

Every Bolshevik, every worker, every citizen of our Soviet country is clearly aware that for the successful and victorious defeat of fascist agents--all these despicable Trotskyites, Bukharinites, and bourgeois nationalities--we are primarily indebted personally to our leader, our great Stalin. . . . The love of the Bolsheviks of the Ukraine for Comrade Stalin reflects the illimitable confidence in and love for the great Stalin of the entire Ukrainian people. . . (Pravda, March, 1939).

From a speech at a meeting of electors of Kalinin electoral district in 1950:

I shall try as well as possible to fulfill the tasks allotted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and our leader and teacher, Comrade Stalin, for the welfare of the Soviet people. . . . In the struggle for the further development of our motherland, for the victory of Communism in our country, the Soviet people are still more closely consolidating their ranks around the Communist Party, around our leader and teacher, our own Stalin (Pravda, March 8, 1950, p. 4).

From a report to the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952:

The victories and achievements are the result of the correct policy of the Communist Party, the wise leadership of the Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee, of our beloved leader and teacher, Comrade Stalin. . . . The successes of our country were achieved because the Party unremittently conducted great organizational work among the masses to put the plans of Stalin's genius into practice. . . .

A new, invaluable, contribution to the theory of Marxism-Leninism is the book by Comrade Stalin, Economic Problems Of Socialism In The USSR. . . .

Long live the wise leader of the Party and people, the inspirer and organizer of our victories, Comrade Stalin (Pravda, October 13, 1952, pp. 1 and 3).

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From Khrushchev's closing speech at the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961:

Comrades have proposed a memorial for the eminent members of the Party and state who became victims of unjustified repression during the period of the cult of personality. It would be expedient to entrust the Central Committee, which will be elected by the Twenty-second Congress, to give a positive solution on this question. Perhaps a monument should be erected in Moscow to perpetuate the memory of comrades who were victims of arbitrary action (Pravda, October 29, 1961).

(11961)

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Outline Of Reference Paper On:

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND CONGRESS OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY

The Twenty-second Party Congress attracted an unprecedented number of delegates--of whom about 70 per cent weren't even in the Party at the end of World War II. The Congress set a precedent also in becoming the scene of an open struggle of such elements as the Albanian Party of Labor and the anti-Party group within the international Communist Party.

It appears that the Kremlin chose this forum to condemn these heretical elements in order to restore its control over the world Communist movement. The Chinese Communist delegation did not graciously submit, however, to the attacks of the Soviet leadership on Albania and struck back. The Congress itself was far from unanimous in endorsing the Soviet condemnation. Not only did most Asian Communist Parties refuse to condemn the tiny Balkan state, but also most of the delegates of the Soviet Central Asian republics refused to do so.

The public humiliation of Voroshilov--inspired by fear of the right-wing element in the Party--apparently was neither planned nor expected by the organizers of the Congress. Surprisingly, delegates disagreed on whether to turn thumbs down on the former Red Army hero, and at the end of the sessions it was obvious that Khrushchev's campaign to drag Voroshilov through mud had failed.

Another potentially dangerous episode occurred when the present Soviet leadership was forced to admit the existence of a letter the disgraced Molotov wrote to the Central Committee. The discussion of this letter, critical of the present Soviet policies, may have shaken the foundations of Khrushchev's brand of Communism, since the Party ranks still contain important officials who share Molotov's views.

On a broader scale, the whole course of the Congress and its resolutions, including the one to move Stalin's remains, cannot but agitate all sections of the Soviet population and give rise to discussions. As a result, the Soviet leadership faces an inevitable process of emancipation of thought.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND CONGRESS OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY

The Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, which lasted for two weeks--October 17-31, 1961--was perhaps the most astonishing Congress in the entire history of the Soviet Communist Party. Also one of the most important, it provided new insight into the projects and problems of the Soviet regime in the USSR and in the world Communist movement.

The composition of the delegates, the new Party program and the new Party statutes signified attempts at rejuvenation and democratization of the Party at all levels. Out of the 9,716,000 Communists of the Soviet Union, 4,799 with deciding and consultative votes, attended the Congress. The number of the delegates was more than three and a half times that of any of the three previous Congresses. The rejuvenation program made itself felt in the large number of delegates--68.1 per cent--who had entered the Party since World War II (Report by chairman of the credentials committee, V. Titov, *Pravda*, October 22, 1961). The process of rejuvenation took place prior to the Congress, when the membership of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, krai Party committees and of oblast Party committees was renewed by 45 per cent at recent elections. The membership of the rayon and city Party committees was renewed by 40 per cent (Report by Frol Kozlov, Radio Moscow, October 29, 1961).

The Congress heard two speeches by Khrushchev, "A Report to the Central Committee" and "A Report on the Party Program," and a report by Kozlov, "On The Statutes," engaged in extensive discussions, heard the foreign delegations, "elected" new members to the leading Party organs, and adopted the required resolutions. The speeches of delegates to past Soviet Party Congresses have been scarcely worth reading because the Congresses--cut-and-dried affairs--had been staged beforehand. The speeches at the Twenty-second Party Congress, however, were exceptionally interesting because they reflected the political and

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psychological upheavals and the bitter internal struggle in the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviet hierarchy, and the world Communist movement. This struggle erupted at the Congress to such an extent that the proclamation of the new Party program and of the statutes became a matter of secondary importance.

From Khrushchev's initial report to the final speeches, the proceedings were dominated by different, but nevertheless closely linked problems including the final condemnation, after a four-year delay, of the "anti-Party" group, the interconnected final denunciation of Stalin, and the unusual condemnation of the Communist leadership of Albania. The discussion of these topics occupied not less than a third of the total discussion period and provided as public a washing of dirty Communist linen as ever experienced in recent years.

The intention of the Soviet leadership in so unexpectedly placing these problems in the foreground has become clear after the conclusion of the Congress. The Kremlin, it is now evident, wished to impose its own general political program on the entire world Communist movement. The Kremlin's program is obviously opposed to that established at the Moscow Conference of World Communist Parties in November, 1960. The November, 1960, program was drawn up under the direct influence of Peking and was compulsory for all Communist parties of the world. The Kremlin's rebuff to the Communist government of Albania was in reality a rebuff to Peking and its policy. By condemning the Albanian government, definitely disowning Stalin, and analyzing in detail what it called the criminal activity of the "anti-Party" group, Khrushchev and his followers tried not only to restore their control over the world Communist movement, which they had lost in November of last year, but also to justify their own revisionist policy.

However, in the steadily developing rivalry between the Kremlin and Peking, the recent Soviet victory won in the presence of delegates of 80 Communist parties from all parts of the world cannot be regarded as decisive. In conveying greetings from the Chinese Communist Party, the Red Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, sharply denounced Khrushchev for leveling charges against the Albanian leadership and said that they were incompatible with basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. He insisted that disagreements between fraternal parties and between fraternal countries should be solved patiently, guided by the spirit of proletarian internationalism, on the principle of equal rights, and through the attainment of unity of views by consultation. Open, one-sided condemnation of a fraternal party does not aid solidarity, does not aid the solution of a question. Openly displaying quarrels between fraternal parties and fraternal countries in the face of enemies cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist approach (Pravda, October 20, 1961).

To counterbalance Khrushchev's ideas on moderating Soviet foreign policy, Chou En-lai made a particularly sharp attack on the United States, to which Khrushchev, he alleged, had decided to give "first place" in the establishment of

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friendly relations. Chou En-lai called the United States "the most evil enemy of the world," "the bulwark of present-day colonialism and international reaction," which was extending its "diabolical clutches" throughout the world. The Red Chinese minister left the Congress after his speech, evidently considering it useless or unwise to remain in Moscow.

Khrushchev did not allow the challenge of the Peking government to go unanswered. In his closing speech he stated with considerable irony:

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attack us with the accusation that we are simplifying or toning down our evaluation of the international situation when we emphasize the necessity of peaceful coexistence in contemporary conditions. They tell us that whoever lays emphasis on peaceful coexistence is displaying an underestimation of the character of imperialism and is even contradicting the Leninist evaluation of imperialism. . . In his speech, the leader of the delegation of the Communist Party of China, Comrade Chou En-lai, expressed anxiety about the open discussion at our Congress of the question of Soviet-Albanian relations. As far as we understand, the main feature of his statement was alarm lest the present state of our relations with the Albanian Party of Labor should affect the solidarity of the socialist camp. We share the alarm of our Chinese friends and value their concern for the strengthening of unity. If the Chinese comrades wish to continue their efforts for the normalization of relations of the Albanian Party of Labor with the fraternal parties, hardly anyone can assist the solution of this task better than the Communist Party of China (Pravda, October 29, 1961).

Surprisingly, however, only 54 per cent of all the world Communist leaders at the Congress went along with Khrushchev. According to the speeches made by the Communist delegations at the Congress and published in the Soviet press by October 31, only 42 delegates denounced the Albanian government in one form or another. It should be noted that with the exception of the Soviet-controlled Mongolian Party, all the Communist Parties of Asia--those of Vietnam, Japan, Indonesia, India, Burma, Pakistan, Thailand, and Malaya--did not support the condemnation of the Albanian Communist Party, but subscribed to the Chinese point of view by stressing their loyalty to the resolutions and principles of the November, 1960, conference.

The attitude of the Asian Communists can be explained not only by the dangerous proximity of China but by the political solidarity of the Asian bloc, symptomatic of a paradoxical division of international Communism into "yellow" and "white." Even more remarkable is the fact that the representatives of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union Republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus (Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaidzhan, Georgia, and Armenia) and the Autonomous Tatar and Bashkir Republics and the Tuva Autonomous Region did not support Khrushchev's accusations against the Albanian Communist leadership. This can hardly be ex-

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plained by mere coincidence or by special stage management, since if there had been such stage management, none of the representatives of the Union or Autonomous Republics would have opposed Albania. As it was, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, Dmitri S. Polyansky, and the first secretaries of the Communist parties of Moldavia and Latvia made sharp attacks on the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party. A number of first secretaries of oblast Party committees of the RSFSR also denounced the Albanian Communist leadership.

Voroshilov's case merits special attention. Apparently unexpectedly both for him and the delegates, from the first day of the Congress, Khrushchev began to denounce him as one of the main instigators of the "anti-Party" group; and this despite the fact that for years Voroshilov had remained President of the Soviet Union and a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. The election of Voroshilov to the Congress Presidium and the subsequent denunciations indicate that the Twenty-second Party Congress lacked the stage management of previous Party Congresses and that the leading ranks of the Party are divided. The composition of the Congress Presidium was no doubt discussed and established at the last plenary session of the Central Committee, and it may be assumed that Voroshilov was included as a symbol of the orthodox wing in the Soviet leadership. It was because Khrushchev and his followers feared an increase in the influence of this wing that they attacked the "anti-Party" group, especially Voroshilov, whom they accused of personal responsibility for the crimes and terror of the Stalin period.

However, the delegates who attacked the "anti-Party" group were by no means unanimous in denouncing Voroshilov. First Secretary of the Communist Party of Tadzhikistan, Rassulov, listed all the members of the "anti-Party" group, and the representative of the Communist Party of Armenia, Zarobiam, criticized Malenkov individually, but the other representatives of the Communist Parties of the Central Asian and Transcaucasian Republics confined their criticism to the anti-Party group in general without recounting any personal details. Such eminent Soviet leaders as, for example, Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, Viktor V. Grishin, and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia, Kirill T. Mazurov, repeatedly denounced only Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov and did not refer to Voroshilov. It may be said that the controversy, which Khrushchev started over Voroshilov, did not lead to the desired results: Khrushchev was obviously compelled in his closing speech to "forgive" Voroshilov. Voroshilov himself, while acknowledging the general accusations against the anti-Party group as correct, denied his participation in it:

During the course of my 58 years in the ranks of our glorious Communist Party, I have never, nowhere, and under no circumstances departed from the demands in the statutes and the program and from the norms for members of our Party. Never have I betrayed the great principles of Marxism-Leninism, never have I participated, nor will

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I ever participate in anti-Party groupings, whatever their name may be (Voroshilov's statement to the Congress, in Pravda, October 29, 1961).

Perhaps the most important criticism of the anti-Party group is the "revelation" by chief editor of Pravda, Pavel A. Satyukov, and director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Pyotr N. Pospelov, that in October, Molotov had written a letter to the Central Committee criticizing the contents of the new program of the Soviet Communist Party. They asserted that Molotov had called the new program "pacifist," "revisionist," anti-revolutionary, "and even contrary to the basic principles of Lenin's teaching. They declared:

It is strange and monstrous to hear from a self-described interpreter of Leninism the assertion that Lenin nowhere and never spoke of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social structures (Satyukov, Pravda, October 27, 1961).

Now Molotov has made a statement which is monstrous in its absurdity and hostility to the whole new course of the Party. He has attacked the next most important thesis of the concluding part of the program: That "not by means of war with other countries, but by example of more perfect organization of society, the flourishing of productive forces, and the creation of all the conditions for the happiness and well-being of man are the ideas of Communism conquering the minds and hearts of the masses of the people." Molotov slanderously asserts that the formulation of the program is in profound opposition to the revolutionary character of Marxist-Leninist teaching (Pospelov, Pravda, October 28, 1961).

Compelled to discuss the contents of Molotov's letter in the Congress, Soviet Party ideologists have subjected the theoretical and political concepts of the present-day Soviet leadership to severe strain before the entire intelligentsia of the Soviet Union. From the standpoint of classical Marxism-Leninism, Molotov's criticism of the new program is absolutely correct, and this is clear to anyone who has made any study of Communist theory. Soviet theoreticians, in accusing Molotov, at Khrushchev's behest, of "slander" before the eyes of the whole Communist world, are thereby convicting the Kremlin of ideological and political revisionism and of juggling with theory.

Further complications for the Soviet leadership are caused by Molotov's open and audacious defense of the purity of Leninism--at the present time and not during the period of the "defeat" of the "anti-Party" group. Frightened by the effect on world public opinion of his criticism, Khrushchev has asserted that this criticism in no way confirms the present-day political situation or the importance of the "anti-Party" group. It is impossible to agree with this assertion,

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however. The flood of criticism and denunciation at the Congress arose as a result of a bitter struggle within the leading ranks of the Soviet Communist Party. Although Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov are in disgrace, the Party still contains important officials who share their views in varying degrees. The danger of the formation of blocs within the Party continues to exist, and the open outburst of the struggle during the Congress has by no means removed it. That this is the case was confirmed by Kozlov, who stated in his report on the Party statutes:

In present-day conditions, do we need any formal statutory guarantees against blocs and groupings? Yes, comrades, such guarantees are necessary.... The sources of ideological waverings on the part of individuals or groups have not yet been eliminated. Some are being subjected to the influence of bourgeois propaganda from without; others, who have not understood the dialectics of the development of social life... will wave aside the new and continue to be chained to the old dogmas which have penetrated life.... The facts show that the organizers of the anti-Party group are to the present day trying to defend their depraved views. Molotov is particularly zealous in this connection (Radio Moscow, October 29, 1961).

The denunciations of the anti-Party group and of Stalin culminated in a resolution to remove his remains from the mausoleum on Red Square. This act, like the accusation that many eminent Party officials bear personal responsibility for Stalin's crimes and for the ruin of innocent Party members, carries the threat of possible future complications in Soviet ruling circles, which can develop into a dangerous upheaval. By permitting and initiating these denunciations, Khrushchev has exposed himself to the possibility of an attack. He and Mikoyan, no less than Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov, were responsible for all the horrors of the period of Stalinist terror. It is sufficient to recall that after the execution of Tukhachevsky and many other Soviet officers, Khrushchev made the following demand for an increase in repression:

I swear that I will not retreat one step from the line pursued by our Leninist-Stalinist Party, our great Stalin.... I summon you all to consolidate your ranks more closely, to deal more firmly and mercilessly with the enemies of the working class, the enemies of the people--this impurity, this weed in our Soviet fields, these traitors... and all other kinds of scoundrels. Comrades, it is they, these scoundrels, who have tried to sell out our country, it is they who have come to an agreement with the fascists, with the Japanese, German-Polish and other counter-intelligence services working against our country... those who have traded the blood of our working class have been unmasked

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by our military chekists, the organs of the people's commissariat of internal affairs headed by Comrade N. I. Yezhov--they are not on our squares. We have ground these scoundrels to dust. Comrades, we have stated, and will state, that we will not allow a single enemy to breathe freely on Soviet soil, that we will mercilessly extirpate and destroy them... I summon you to greater hatred of our enemies. We will show still greater love for our Bolshevik Party, our leader, the great Stalin (Pravda, December 2, 1937).

Mikoyan, too, while presiding with Khrushchev at a meeting to celebrate twenty years of the activities of the Extraordinary Committee for Struggle with Counterrevolution, Sabotage, and Speculation, placed particular emphasis in his report on the brilliant results of the "recent period" of activity of the NKVD and stated that "at the head of the Soviet punitive organs, the Party has placed N. I. Yezhov, a true Stalinist pupil whose words always matched his deeds. The NKVD has worked gloriously during this period" (Pravda, December 21, 1937).

In his closing speech at the Twenty-second Party Congress, Khrushchev proposed that a monument be erected in Moscow to commemorate the innocent victims of the Stalinist terror. There is no doubt that he will thereby gain popularity and a certain amount of sympathy among broad sections of the Soviet population, but at the cost of a flexible and authoritarian control of the country and the people in the future.

The whole course of the Twenty-second Congress and its resolutions cannot but agitate all sections of the Soviet population and give rise to quarrels and discussions on a broad scale. The following statement on the work of the Committee of State Security is significant:

... In the organs of state security, distortions and violations of socialist legality have been completely eliminated... These have been ended once and for all... now nobody can be declared guilty of perpetrating crimes and subjected to punishment except by the sentence of a court. In our country the inviolability of the person is guaranteed not in words but in deeds (Pravda, October 27, 1961).

As a result of the Congress, the Soviet leadership is faced with the prospect of an inevitable process of emancipation of thought, an increase in the trend toward democratization among various sections of the Soviet population, especially among the young Soviet intelligentsia.

(11961)